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On	 January	 12,	 2021,	 the	National	 Collegiate	Athletic	Association	
(NCAA)	delayed	what	would	 be	 the	most	 significant	 policy	 shift	 in	 the	
association	 in	 almost	 40	 years.	 	 The	 proposal	 would	 allow	 student‐
athletes,	for	the	first	time,	to	earn	revenue	and	profit	from	the	use	of	their	






continues	with	a	 series	of	 internal,	 congressional,	 legal,	and	 legislative	
proposals	seeking	to	revolutionize	the	amateur	sports	behemoth.	
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I. Introduction 
A. WHAT IS THE NCAA? 
The NCAA is a tax-exempt, unincorporated association that 
recognizes approximately 1,100 colleges and universities as members.1  
It sponsors over 90 championships in 24 different men’s and women’s 
sports and claims about half a million student-athletes participating at 
the collegiate level.2  The NCAA is governed by its Board of Governors, 
while its policy-making body is a series of committees composed of 
volunteers from its member schools.3  The NCAA maintains a three-tier 
system of divisions for competitions.  Division I is considered the most 
competitive and allows schools competing at this level to award 
students athletics-based scholarships, financial aid, and other benefits 
for athletic participation.4  The NCAA maintains maximum scholarship 
limits for each sport, although it is up to the individuals schools to 
determine how many scholarships they award each year, within the 
NCAA limits. 5  Division I includes many of the largest schools in the 
country.  There are currently 350 schools and over 182,000 student-
athletes competing at the Division I level.6  The majority of the 
professional players drafted into the major American sports leagues 
come from the Division I ranks.7   
Division II, like Division I, provides its member schools with the 
ability to issue athletics-based financial aid; however, the amount of 
 
	 1	 What	 is	 the	 NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Apr. 10, 2021); see also	National	Collegiate	
Athlete	 Association, Nonprofit Explorer, 
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/440567264/20171137934
9300841/IRS990 (last visited July 1, 2021). 
	 2	 Id. 
	 3	 See Governance, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/governance (last visited July 1, 
2021).	
	 4	 See Our	Division	I	Students, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/our-division-i-students 
(last visited July 1, 2021). 
 5 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, OPERATING BYLAWS, 15.01.1 (Aug. 1, 2020), 
https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D121.pdf. 
 6 NCAA, RECRUITING FACTS, COLLEGE SPORTS CREATE A PATHWAY TO OPPORTUNITY FOR 
STUDENT ATHLETES (Aug. 2020), 
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/compliance/recruiting/NCAA_RecruitingFactShee
t.pdf.	 Our	 Three	 Divisions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions (last visited Apr. 10, 2021). 
	 7	 See Chip Patterson, 2021	NFL	Draft	 Picks	 by	 College	 Team, CBS, May 1, 2021, 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/2021-nfl-draft-picks-by-college-
team-school-georgia-leads-sec-on-day-2-notre-dame-and-ohio-state-shine/.  For a 
historical analysis of NBA Draft data, see Basketball,	 NBA	 Draft	 Finder, Stathead 
Basketball, https://stathead.com/basketball/draft_finder.cgi (last visited July 1, 2021).  
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scholarships per sport is lower than Division I.8  Division II schools also 
tend to either have smaller enrolled populations and/or dedicate less 
resources to athletics than their Division I counterparts.9  Finally, 
Division III is the largest division based on the number of schools with 
438 members—approximately 40% of the total NCAA membership.10  
The NCAA includes an elaborate structure of policy committees that are 
mainly composed of administrators with input from various student-
athlete groups for generating overall NCAA policy.11  “The NCAA Manual, 
published and revised annually, contains the NCAA’s constitution, 
bylaws, executive regulations, enforcement procedures, recommended 
policies, and rules of order.”12  Additionally, each division also has its 
own self-governance and rule-making apparatus.13 
There are several principles that are the tenets of the NCAA, 
including the “Principle of Amateurism” that requires that student-
athletes not be compensated directly for athletic performance.14  This 
principle is the key differentiator between college athletics and 
professional sports, where professional athletes can be very highly 
compensated for their athletic performance.  Unlike professional 
leagues that have unions that represent the player-workers and 
participate in collective bargaining, student-athletes do not have a 
formal, direct vote in NCAA policymaking.  Instead, NCAA “legislation” is 
voted on by its member schools.15  
The NCAA was originally formed in the early 1900s to protect the 
health and safety of students participating in the emerging sport of 
football on campuses across the country.  Specifically, the organization 
was formed in 1905 in response to a call to action from then-President 
Theodore Roosevelt to the university presidents of Harvard, Yale, and 
Princeton, to address the mounting injuries—and even deaths—in 
 
	 8	 See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020); NCAA, DIVISION II MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 
2020; NCAA, DIVISION III MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020). 
	 9	 See About	 Division	 II, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d2 (last 
visited July 1, 2021).  
	 10	 Our	 Three	 Divisions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions (last visited Apr. 10, 2021).  Jeff K. Brown, 
Compensation	for	the	Student‐Athlete:	Preservation	of	Amateurism, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
147, 148 (1996). 
11 See Governance,	NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/governance/ (last visited July 1, 2021).  
 12 Brown, supra note 10. 	
	 13	 See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020); NCAA, DIVISION II MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 
2020; NCAA, DIVISION III MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020). 
 14 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, CONSTITUTION, 2.9 (Aug. 1, 2020), 
https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D121.pdf. 
	 15	 Id. at 3.2.1.7.1. 
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football among colleges around the country.16  A number of prominent 
schools banded together to charter an organization known as the 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States, which was later 
renamed to its present name in 1910.17  From the beginning, the NCAA’s 
charge was to unilaterally protect the health and safety of students 
competing in intercollegiate athletics by creating standards and 
regulations to curb injuries and deaths in connection with participation 
in intercollegiate sports.18  The NCAA remained small as a governing 
organization—it did not hire its first full-time employee until 1951—but 
mushroomed to over 500 employees today.19  Throughout its history, 
the NCAA has remained a private, non-governmental self-regulatory 
association.  However, as the complexity of college athletics grew and 
evolved, so have the NCAA’s scope and breadth of responsibility. 
As the popularity of college athletics grew, the negative influences 
of competition led to calls for more oversight to ensure fair competition.  
The desire to win on the field drove schools to recruit high-level athletes 
and began to offer financial incentives in the form of academic aid to 
individuals to lure students to their institutions so they would compete 
for the schools.20  In response, the NCAA established its first set of 
recruiting and financial aid rules in the late 1950s.21  At the time, the 
rules were very strict and limited the ability of schools to provide 
incentives to prospective student-athletes.22  These restraints were only 
intended to maintain the member-schools academic mission by 
disallowing financial windfalls from sports drive students’ school 
selection decisions. 
However, that did not stop schools from seeking a competitive 
advantage in other ways.  In University	of	Denver	v.	Nemeth,23 a former 
student sued for workers compensation when he suffered a back injury 
while participating for the school’s intercollegiate football team, 
 
 16 Jim Weathersby, Teddy	Roosevelt’s	Role	 in	 the	Creation	of	 the	NCAA, THE SPORTS 
HISTORIAN (July 6, 2016), https://www.thesportshistorian.com/teddy-roosevelts-role-
in-the-creation-of-the-ncaa/#. 
	 17	 Id. 
	 18	 Id. 
	 19	 See National	Office	Leadership	Team, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/who-
we-are/office-president/ncaa-senior-leadership-team (last visited July 1, 2021).  
 20 John Kibilko, The	 History	 of	 Sports	 Scholarships, SAPLING, 
https://www.sapling.com/8144923/history-sports-scholarships (last visited July 1, 
2021). 
	 21	 Id. 
 22 Andy Staples, A	History	 of	Recruiting;	How	Coaches	Have	 Stayed	a	 Step	Ahead, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 23, 2008), https://www.si.com/more-
sports/2008/06/23/recruiting-main.  
 23 University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953). 
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preventing him from fulfilling his duties as an on-campus maintenance 
worker, an arrangement that helped provide access to school and secure 
his participation in football.24  Nemeth prevailed in showing that the 
school routinely arranged employment for athletes and, therefore, 
participating in football was part of his job duties to the university.25  
This led the NCAA to coin the term “student-athlete,” add it to their 
bylaws, and draw a distinction between a student participating in 
intercollegiate athletics from anything else they may do on campus, 
including employment.26  It also clarified that student-athletes were not 
being compensated for athletic participation.27 
B. WHERE DOES THE NCAA FIT IN THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SPORTS 
LANDSCAPE? 
In the United States, the sports hierarchy is very disjointed.  There 
are a variety of organizations that are involved in the regulation and 
organization of sports programs, from purely recreational activities 
through to professional level competitions.  While there are established 
norms in the development process of each sport, the succession plan for 
an athlete to ascend to higher levels in a particular sport can vary 
immensely from one sport to another, and meander through a collection 
of organizations.  At best, these organizations are loosely connected and, 
in some cases, they are not connected at all.  
Purely recreational programs are generally run by non-profit 
organizations, social clubs, schools, or government agencies.  Their 
intention is to provide children, and even adults, with an opportunity for 
physical activity, education, and pure recreation.  Generally, organized 
sports, are governed either directly or indirectly, by nonprofit national 
governing organizations,28 or by national governing bodies (NGBs) that 
are often affiliated with the United States Olympic and Paralympic 
Committee.  There may also be intermediary organizational levels, such 
as state or regional associations or leagues that help administer 
competition.  These intervening organizations include the YMCA and the 
Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) network are major organizers for sports 
such as swimming or gymnastics and track and field or basketball, 
respectively.  For most of these sports, the pinnacle of their sports 
 
	 24	 Id. at 424-25. 
	 25	 Id. at 430. 
 26 Former NCAA Executive Director Walter Byers is credited with coining the term 
“student-athlete” in 1964.   
 27 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, Principal of Amateurism, (Aug. 1, 2020). 
 28 Federal tax law provides tax exemption for amateur athletics.  See 26 U.S.C. § 
501(c)(3) (exemption from tax on corporations, certain trusts, etc.).  
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competition pyramid ends with the Olympics or world championships 
where the top athletes are able to represent their country in athletic 
competition. 
Separately, educational institutions run their own athletic 
structure.  While elementary and middle school programs are typically 
run locally, high school sports are typically administered through 
statewide athletic organizations that provide governance, organization, 
and administer championship events.29  While most state organizations 
belong to the National Federation of High School Associations which 
provides some support and coordination amongst members, each state 
typically administers its own competitive programs. 30  High school 
sports tend to function independently from the national governing 
sports bodies in many sports, such as soccer and basketball, and create 
different rules for high school competition versus non-high school 
competition.31  In other sports, such as football, baseball, and softball, 
that are not aligned with the United States Olympic & Paralympic 
Committee (USOPC), high school rules are often independently 
developed and align informally to the sport’s “norms.”32  In many of 
these sports, the rules of play vary at different levels without a cohesive 
central governing body. 
  The role of professional sports leagues in athletic development 
varies greatly in the United States.  The National Hockey League and 
Major League Baseball maintain several levels of “minor leagues” where 
promising athletes can be developed to determine if they have what it 
takes to reach the major league level.33  The National Basketball 
Association recently started to develop the NBA G-League as their 
official developmental league.34  While there is a growing trend of the 
top high school players bypassing college competition for the G-League, 
this has been very limited to date.35  Instead, the majority of G-League 
players are former college players who were not able to make NBA 
rosters, yet are still aspiring to do so.  Major League Soccer (MLS) has 
the most extensive player development process with their “academy” 
 
	 29	 About	 Us,	 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS, 
https://www.nfhs.org/who-we-are/aboutus (last visited April 10, 2021).  
	 30	 Id. 
	 31	 Id. 
	 32	 Id. 
	 33	 Id.	 
 34 Official Release, NBA G League Introduces New Professional Path for Elite 
Basketball Prospect (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.nba.com/news/g-league-
professional-path-official-release. 
	 35	 Id.	 
BONDAROWICZ (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2021  7:35 PM 
2021]	 The	NCAA’s	Historical	Challenges	 581 
structure extending down to pre-teen ages.36  The NFL has almost no 
role in the developmental process.  It does not maintain a minor league 
nor are there internal pathways for youth athletes to the professional 
ranks.  Instead, they rely on the college ranks to develop their talent for 
them.  By comparison, European soccer clubs maintain an integrated 
structure from the youth level to the professional ranks.  While most 
youth sports in the United States maintain a “pay to play” system, 
European clubs usually have low or no cost youth programs where they 
instead look to garner development fees from other clubs who sign their 
developed talent to professional contracts.37 
 NCAA sports align most closely with other education-based sports 
programs, such as high school athletics, and create a unique character 
to college sports.  The NCAA create its own eligibility and recruiting 
rules and maintain their own unique rules of competition.  For example, 
pass interference and time management rules in NCAA football are 
different than similar rules in the NFL.  College basketball games are 40 
minutes, broken into two 20-minute halves, while NBA games run 48 
minutes and are played in 12-minute quarters.  NCAA rules in other 
sports can also vary from rules in non-NCAA competition.  Like high 
school sports, college athletes are not paid for their participations and 
are thus considered amateur athletes.  Yet, the unique nature of college 
sports does not limit their popularity and ability to generate revenue.  
For example, college football programs broadcast more games in total 
per week than the NFL.38   
The NCAA also plays a vital role in player development.  For the 
NFL, almost all of their new talent each season emerges from the college 
ranks through the draft process.  NFL draft rules require an aspiring 
player to be at least three years removed from high school or at least 
twenty years of age to be eligible to be drafted.39  That leaves players 
with few options other than to play college football.  The NBA also has a 
similar draft rule although their rule only requires one year of post-high 
 
 36 Associated Press,	MLS	 Unveils	 New	 Youth	 Development	 Plan	 After	 U.S.	 Soccer	
Shutters	 Academy	 Program, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/05/14/mls-youth-academy-development-
program-us-soccer. 
	 37	 Id.  
 38 The National Football League is composed of thirty-two teams playing games once 
per week.  There are over 130 NCA Division I Bowl Subdivision teams also playing 
weekly.  Almost all FBS games are broadcast through lineal or streaming services 
through various contracts and broadcasting arrangements.   
 39 Collective Bargaining Agreement by and Between the National Football League 
and the National Football League Players Association, at 34 (2020), available at 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/website/PDFs/CBA/March-15-2020-NFL-
NFLPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement-Final-Executed-Copy.pdf.   
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school development and at least nineteen years of age.40  The Women’s 
National Basketball League (WNBA) requires draft prospects to be at 
least twenty-two years old during the calendar year in which such Draft 
is held and have either completed their college degree or have 
renounced any remaining intercollegiate eligibility.41  Participating in 
college football and basketball allows players to mature physically, hone 
their athletic skills, and also gain name recognition, before they become 
eligible for professional drafts.  For athletes in many Olympic sports, 
college competition provides enhanced training and coaching, access to 
facilities, and a team environment for athletes to continue competing in 
their sports.  Collegiate level-sports is often the highest level of 
competition available to many athletes who do not qualify for national 
teams in sports such as swimming, rowing, or gymnastics.   
In the majority of the twenty-four NCAA-sponsored sports, athletes 
often toil in relative obscurity without major televised appearances, 
media, or other recognition.  Even the top competitors in most of these 
sports are largely anonymous to the general public.  Conversely, a few 
NCAA-sponsored sports—namely football and basketball—receive 
significant marketing and public relations support such that many of the 
sports’ top athletes enjoy higher name recognition than many 
professional athletes in their sports.  These sports generate millions of 
dollars in revenue from lucrative television contracts and live 
attendance.  As a result, NCAA schools pour millions into marketing, 
upgrading facilities, and promoting these particular sports to drive 
attendance and recruit the best athletes in a self-perpetuating cycle.42  
The success of college football and basketball has also brought 
significant criticism because generated revenues are not shared with 
the players in the same way they are in professional sports leagues. In 
professional leagues, collective bargaining forces a certain percentage 
of league revenues to flow to the players in the form of salary and 
benefits. 
 
 40 Collective Bargaining Agreement by and Between the National Basketball 
Association and the National Basketball Players Association, at 273 (2017), available at 
https://cosmic-s3.imgix.net/3c7a0a50-8e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-2017-NBA-
NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf. 
 41 Collective Bargaining Agreement by and Between the Woman’s National 
Basketball Association and the Woman’s National Basketball Players Association, at 110 
(2020), available at https://wnbpa.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/WNBA-
WNBPA-CBA-2020-2027.pdf. 
	 42	 See	David	Ridpath, Who	Actually	Funds	Intercollegiate	Athletic	Programs?, FORBES 
(Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ccap/2014/12/12/who-actually-
funds-intercollegiate-athletic-programs/?sh=3277fb0f17af. 
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The distribution of revenues in college sports versus professional 
leagues is another major difference that separates them.  In professional 
domestic leagues, the business model is singularly focused around a 
single team competing in a single sport.  So, the constituents are very 
easy to establish for the distribution of revenues – players and 
management.  Conversely, colleges face a much different challenge.  
College athletic departments are organized as nonprofit entities, 
therefore, private inurement is prohibited.  There are no “owners” or 
“shareholders” and, likewise, the concept of revenue-sharing is not 
possible in the same way it is in the professional leagues.  Instead, 
revenues beyond those needed to run the business are redistributed 
across a school’s entire athletic program.  Currently, the NCAA requires 
each school competing at the Division I level to maintain a minimum of 
sixteen teams.43  Title IX requires that schools receiving any form of 
federal funding offer athletic opportunities to both men and women in 
proportion to the gender balance at each school.44  These two 
requirements limit some of the business decisions that schools can 
make for themselves by forcing a broader dispersal of revenues than a 
typical professional team.  In fact, most NCAA schools are dependent on 
subsidies from their universities, donations from sponsors, and student 
fees to alleviate budget deficits.45  
The complexity of the sports landscape does not provide a clear 
answer on whether NCAA sports more closely resemble professional or 
amateur sports organizations.  Competitively, it can be argued that 
college sports are intended to be competitions organized for amateurs; 
however, the revenue generating potential of college sports makes it 
difficult to view it as purely “amateur.”  So, the debate shifts to whether 
NCAA athletics should be viewed as commercial activity – like 
professional leagues – or more like their not-for-profit brethren. 
 
 43 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020).  See also Preparing	for	Budget	Crunch,	Five	
Conferences	 Ask	 NCAA	 for	 Relief, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (April 15, 2020), 
https://www.si.com/college/2020/04/15/ncaa-conferences-coronavirus-pandemic-
impact. 
 44 Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir.1993).   
	 45	 See Finances	 of	 Intercollegiate	 Athletics, NCAA, 
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/finances-intercollegiate-athletics 
(last visited July 1, 2021). 
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II. The Rise of Antitrust Claims in Professional Sports 
A. HISTORY OF NCAA AND ANTITRUST 
Professional sports have been subject to antitrust scrutiny since 
the early 1900s.  Federal	Baseball	Club	v.	National	League 46 provided 
professional baseball with a shield from antitrust by classifying baseball 
as an “exhibition” and not actual interstate commerce.47  The Federal	
Baseball	Club decision protected the industry of professional baseball 
from antitrust scrutiny for decades, particularly in the area of labor 
relations.48  Baseball was able to restrict the freedom of players to 
change teams/employers at the expiration of their employment 
contracts through a concept known as the “reserve clause.”49  The 
reserve clause was challenged in Flood	v.	Kuhn,50 although the  Supreme 
Court leaned on stare decisis and cited Federal	 Baseball	 Club in its 
opinion.51  Flood became the watershed case that gave rise to the power 
and influence of organized labor in professional sports.  The Major 
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) was officially recognized 
as a union in 1966.52  While the MLBPA never overcame the precedent 
of Federal	Baseball	 Club, the sport suffered through numerous labor 
stoppages over the next forty years.53 
Other professional sports leagues were not as lucky in avoiding 
antitrust scrutiny.  In 1956, the National Football League (NFL) was first 
exposed to antitrust scrutiny.54  Bill Radovich, an offensive lineman who 
played for the NFL’s Detroit Lions, bucked the NFL when he decided to 
join the Los Angeles Dons of the rival All-America Football Conference 
 
 46 Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
	 47	 Id.	at 209.  
 48 A number of labor and employment challenges were waged against Major League 
Baseball after the Court’s decision in Federal	 Baseball.  The courts have cited the 
precedent set in that case on many occasions.  See	Curt Flood v. Bowie Kuhn, et. al. 407 
U.S. 258. 	
 49 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259 (1972).	
	 50	 Id. 
	 51	 Id. at 290. 
	 52	 The	History	of	Baseball	Unionization:	The	MLBPA	Before	it	was	the	MLBPA, MARC 
NORMANDIN (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.marcnormandin.com/2020/10/16/the-
history-of-baseball-unionization-the-mlbpa-before-it-was-the-mlbpa/. 
 53 Nick Selbe, This	Day	in	Sports	History:	MLB	Players	Go	on	Their	First	Strike, SPORTS 





 54 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 446 (1957).  
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(AAFC).55  He was subsequently “blacklisted” from returning to 
employment with any NFL-affiliated teams and filed suit.56  In Radovich	
v.	National	Football	League,57 the Supreme Court determined that the 
NFL constituted a business under American antitrust laws but did not 
enjoy the same antitrust protection as Major League Baseball.58  
Meanwhile, the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) 
gained momentum amongst players around the same time and was 
officially recognized as the bargaining unit in 1956.59  The burgeoning 
union made small inroads in its representation of NFL players until 
work stoppages in the 1980s and 1990s solidified its standing in labor 
negotiations.60  
On the business front, the NFL also faced antitrust scrutiny in its 
televised broadcasting of games.  The NFL, unlike other professional 
sports leagues at the time, relied on the pooling of broadcasting rights 
among its members to offer networks a collective bundle of rights.61  
This arrangement was viewed as anticompetitive; however, the NFL 
was successfully able to lobby Congress for the passage of the Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 1961, which provided a limited antitrust 
exemption.62  This Act was also a catalyst in clearing the way for the 
merger of the American Football League and the National Football 
League into the NFL we know today.63  
B. THE NCAA’S CHALLENGES WITH ANTITRUST ISSUES 
Until the 1970s the education-based institutions that were part of 
the NCAA were viewed more like high school sports than professional 
sports despite the growing revenue that was driven largely by live 
 
	 55	 Id. at 448. 
	 56	 Id. 
 57 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 446 (1957).  
	 58	 Id.	at 447-48, 452. 
	 59	 See	 Our	 History	 of	 Wins, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, 
https://nflpa.com/about/history (last visited Apr. 7, 2021). 
	 60	 See	 NFL	 Labor	 History	 Since	 1968, ESPN.COM (Mar. 3, 2011), 
https://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?page=nfl_labor_history. 
 61 The	Sports	Broadcasting	Act	of	1961 was passed in response to a court decision 
which ruled that the NFL’s method of negotiating television broadcasting rights violated 
antitrust laws.  See	United	States	of	America	v.	National	Football	League,	196	F.	Supp.	445; 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2018). 
	 62	 See	Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2018). 
 63 The two leagues were considered rivals previously and subject to antitrust 
scrutiny otherwise.  See	Cecilia Kang,	How	the	Government	Helps	the	NFL	Maintain	 its	
Power	 and	 Profitability, WASH. POST, (Sept. 16, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2014/09/16/how-the-
government-helps-the-nfl-maintain-its-power-and-profitability/.   
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attendance.  As the importance of television as a broadcasting medium 
grew in the 1940s and 1950s, the NCAA largely eschewed broadcasting 
rights for its membership as it was viewed as a threat to live attendance 
revenue that almost all NCAA members relied upon.64  In 1953, the 
NCAA began to offer a very restrictive package of televised games that 
allowed only one televised game per week, did not allow a school to play 
in more than one televised game per season, and required all members 
of the NCAA to share in the revenue.65  The NCAA used its central role in 
collegiate sports to drive compliance from its members. 
Despite increasingly restrictive rules in its control of television 
rights, the NCAA was largely spared from antitrust scrutiny until the 
1970s.  In 1979, the College Football Association (CFA), an association 
of sixty-four football-playing universities, challenged the NCAA’s 
monopoly on negotiating television rights on behalf of member schools 
by negotiating its own rights deal.66  In response, the NCAA sought to 
impose sanctions against the schools that participated in the CFA deal.67  
The sanctions were met with a suit brought by the University of Georgia 
and University of Oklahoma in the case that became known as Board	of	
Regents	v.	NCAA.68  In this case, the University of Georgia and University 
of Oklahoma sued the NCAA claiming the association’s restrictions on 
schools’ rights to unfettered televised broadcasting of college football 
games was an unlawful restraint on trade in violation of the Sherman 
Act and United States antitrust laws.69  The NCAA countered the 
allegations with a “rule of reason” affirmative defense, claiming that 
limiting an individual school’s ability to appear on television and 
controlling the overall supply of televised games benefits members by 
encouraging live attendance at games and providing more schools with 
the opportunity to appear on television.70 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.71  This ruling 
essentially rendered the NCAA powerless and irrelevant in the 
expansion of televised college football and ultimately the tremendous 
growth and commercialization of college sports, namely football and 
basketball.72  This holding also sparked a power shift from the NCAA to 
the CFA to negotiate broadcasting deals with networks, thereby 
 
 64 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 89–90 (1984). 
	 65	 Id. at 90, 92–94. 
	 66	 Id. at 94–95. 
	 67	 Id. at 95. 
	 68	 Id. at 88. 
	 69	 Id. 
	 70	 Nat’l	Collegiate	Athletic	Ass’n, 468 U.S., at 113-115. 
	 71	 Id.	at 120. 
	 72	 Id. 
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decentralizing power.  Conferences were the beneficiaries as their role 
as aggregators of media rights for a smaller subset of schools provided 
an opportunity to establish conference-based networks such as the Big 
Ten Network and SEC Network. 
As the revenue from increased television exposure has grown since 
the 1980s, it has created a significant amount of upheaval within the 
NCAA.  Schools started to shift allegiances from their conference 
alliances, creating widespread realignment that was based more on 
revenue opportunities rather than regional rivalries and other 
synergies that were the traditional basis for conference membership. 
C. THE NCAA’S CURRENT ANTITRUST BATTLE GROUND 
While the NCAA’s loss in Board	of	Regents created an entirely new 
economic landscape in college athletics, it also opened the NCAA up to 
additional challenges on antitrust grounds by other constituencies.  In 
response, some courts have provided some level of protection for the 
NCAA and its ability to regulate college athletics—including 
amateurism—while not limiting its ability to curtail economic activity 
within its enterprise. 
In addition to the challenges accompanying the Board	of	Regents 
ruling, the NCAA faced another major challenge to its authority to 
regulate college football.  Rumors concerning Southern Methodist 
University (SMU), one of the top college football teams in the mid-1980s, 
began to surface concerning impermissible benefits, including cash, 
provided by boosters to SMU’s current players and potential recruits.  
These payments were intended to retain top players and allow SMU to 
stay on top of their sport.73  The egregious and repeated violations of the 
NCAA’s amateurism rules led to the “death penalty” for SMU’s football 
program as it was unable to compete in 1987 and 1988.74  In response, 
SMU alumni filed suit against the NCAA challenging its authority to 
sanction the school by cancelling it’s 1987 season.  In McCormack	v.	Nat’l	
Collegiate	 Athletic	 Assoc.,75 the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA’s 
suspension of SMU’s football program for violation of its amateurism 
rules, which prevented student-athletes from being compensated, was 
a violation of the Sherman Act. 76  In this Fifth Circuit opinion, the Court 
struck down this challenge to the NCAA and provided some protection 
for amateurism.77  The Court reasoned that the restrictions imposed by 
 
 73 Mark Asher, NCAA	Cancels	SMU’s	1987	Football, WASH. POST, (Feb. 26, 1987). 
	 74	 Id. 
 75 McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).  
	 76	 Id.	at 1340. 
 77 Brown, supra note 10, at 149 (citing McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1340). 
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amateurism protected the “special product” that college athletics is from 
the increasing commercialization pressures that were starting to engulf 
college sports.78  
Another challenge to the NCAA’s authority actually pre-dated the 
SMU case, although the Supreme Court did not rule on the issue until 
1988.  In 1977, the NCAA investigated the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas (“UNLV”), for  questionable recruiting practices involving their 
head coach Jerry Tarkanian.79  Tarkanian was an outspoken critic of the 
NCAA’s regulatory regime dating back to his time as head coach at his 
previous school, Long Beach State in California, where he was also 
sanctioned.80  Tarkanian was sanctioned at Long Beach State for 
compliance issues and for criticizing the NCAA for being lenient with 
large schools while it instead “picked on” smaller schools that did not 
have the resources to fight against it.81  The NCAA levied sanctions 
against UNLV and the school bowed into the pressure and promptly 
suspended Tarkanian for two seasons.82  Tarkanian filed suit against the 
NCAA in Nevada state court.83  The NCAA challenged the injunction in a 
case that eventually was argued before the Supreme Court.84  The 
Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA was not a state actor, and thus was 
not subject to the same sort of due process requirements as a 
governmental agency.85  The NCAA was not found to be sufficiently 
entangled with state universities, nor was it found that UNLV, a public 
university, delegated enough authority to the NCAA to make the 
association a state actor.86  
In the wake of the Tarkanian case, the State of Nevada passed a law 
which attempted to force the NCAA to provide additional due process 
protections to institutions, coaches, and student-athletes in Nevada.87  
The law also prevented the NCAA from retaliating against Nevada 
 
 78 Brown, supra note 10. 
	 79	 See Tarkanian v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,	741	 P.2d	 1345	 (Nev.	 1987)	 for 
procedural history.  This long standing litigation grew out of an initial investigation by 
the NCAA in the UNLV basketball program and its head coach’s recruiting activity. 
	 80	 See Case	 Decision	 Against	 Long	 Beach	 State, Legislative Database for Major 
Infractions, NCAA (published Jan. 6, 1974), 
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView?id=277. 
	 81	 Id. 
	 82	 Nat’l	Collegiate	Athletic	Ass’n., 488 U.S. at 180. 
 83 Tarkanian v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987). 
	 84	 Nat’l	Collegiate	Athletic	Ass’n., 488 U.S. at 182. 
	 85	 Id. at 195.	
	 86	 Id. at 199. 
 87 J. M. Schwartz,	Recent	Development:	NCAA v. Tarkanian:	State	Action	In	Collegiate	
Athletics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1703, 1709-10 (1989). 
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schools for the enactment of the law.88  The NCAA challenged the law 
based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, a corollary to the Commerce 
Clause, which prevents a state from passing laws which unduly burden 
interstate commerce.89  The NCAA won the case in the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, with Nevada’s state law being deemed 
unconstitutional.90 
 Ironically, although the Supreme Court did not find the NCAA to be 
a “state actor” in the Tarkanian case, it later reversed itself in a similar 
case affecting high school athletics regulation.  In Brentwood	Academy	v.	
Tennessee	Secondary	School	Athletic	Association	 (TSSAA),91 the TSSAA 
imposed recruiting violations on Brentwood Academy, a private high 
school in the state.92  The Supreme Court ruled, in a 5-4 decision, that 
the TSSAA was a “state actor” and thus violated Brentwood’s due 
process rights.93  This case was distinguished from Tarkanian in that 
TSSAA’s actions were authorized and regulated under state law and it 
predominantly regulated public schools.94  This case established a 
distinction between college and high school athletics.95  
The growing importance of football revenues, and to a lesser extent 
basketball, provided coaches with leverage to demand skyrocketing 
salaries and other benefits which greatly increased schools’ budgets.96  
Salaries for a handful of men’s basketball assistant coaches surpassed 
levels that typically were more akin to head coaches and placed a strain 
on resources for smaller schools looking to compete against schools 
with greater revenues.97  In response, the NCAA attempted to rein in 
overall expenditures on coaches’ salaries by establishing a category for 
“restricted earnings coaches” which would be capped at $16,000 per 
year.98  These restrictions were immediately met with an antitrust suit 
from coaches impacted by the new rule claiming the new rules were a 
restraint on trade.  In Law	v.	Nat’l	Collegiate	Athletic	Ass’n,	 the Tenth 
 
	 88	 Id. 
	 89	 Id. 
	 90	 Id. 
 91 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n., 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
	 92	 Id.	at 293.  
	 93	 Id. at 291. 
	 94	 Id. at 297-98. 
	 95	 Id.  
	 96	 See	Where	Does	the	Money	Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/where-does-
money-go (last visited Apr. 7, 2021). 
	 97	 See NCAA	Salaries, USA TODAY, https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/ (last 
visited July 1, 2021). 
	 98	 See Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016, 1024 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
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Circuit ruled that such caps were not protected under the rule of reason 
and did indeed place undue restraints on trade.	99   
The biggest challenge to the NCAA, however, has been over a 
decade in the making on how it classifies its student-athletes.  As 
schools’ athletic department budgets have grown exponentially, the 
opportunities and benefits to players have not grown at the same rate.  
These additional revenues have largely flowed into even higher coaches’ 
salaries and other department priorities such as facilities and 
multimedia.100  Student-athlete benefits have expanded mainly in 
reaction to bad publicity – such as players not being provided sufficient 
food and nutrition – and legal challenges.101  The NCAA faced more 
public scrutiny as its revenues continued to increase exponentially 
while student-athletes did not see proportional increases in benefits.	
In a progression that will transform college athletics, former UCLA 
and NBA star Edward O’Bannon filed an antitrust suit in 2009 against 
the NCAA.  O’Bannon claimed that the NCAA engaged in unauthorized 
use of student-athletes names, images, and likenesses in the 
broadcasting of college sporting events and that they should be 
compensated for such use after they graduate.102  While the plaintiffs 
initially prevailed at the trial court level, the decision was partially 
reversed on appeal.103  The U.S. Supreme court denied certiorari in 
2016.104	
A separate suit, Jenkins	v.	NCAA,105 challenged the NCAA’s financial 
aid caps for student-athletes.106  These caps limited financial aid awards 
 
	 99	 Id.	at 1016, 1024. 
 100 Dr. Kevin Blue, Rising	Expenses	 in	College	Athletics	and	 the	Non‐Profit	Paradox, 
ATHLETIC DIRECTOR U, https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/kevin-blue-rising-
expenses-in-college-athletics-and-the-non-profit-paradox/ (last visited Apr. 7, 20201). 
 101 In response to a public outcry from comments made by University of Connecticut 
star Shabazz Napier during the 2014 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament about 
student-athletes not having enough food to eat some nights, the NCAA abruptly 
amended its regulations to allow schools to provide unlimited meals.  See Mike Singer, 
Connecticut’s	Shabazz	Napier:	‘We	do	have	hungry	nights’, CBS (April 7, 2014), 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/connecticuts-shabazz-napier-
we-do-have-hungry-nights/.  
 102 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015). 
	 103	 Id. 
	 104	 Id. 
 105 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. 
(Jenkins v. NCAA), 958 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom; Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (Dec. 16, 2020), and cert. granted sub nom; 
Am. Athletic Conf. v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 972, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2020). 
 106 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. 
(Jenkins v. NCAA), 958 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom; Nat’l Collegiate 
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to the value of tuition, room and board, and required fees at each 
school.107  While the plaintiffs initially prevailed, the verdict was 
rendered moot on appeal as the NCAA had already made some 
concessions in their bylaws to provide for “full cost of attendance” 
grants which provided student-athletes with allowances beyond the 
challenged restrictions.108	
The most recent legal challenge will likely be the most significant 
as the U.S. Supreme Court has granted the NCAA’s petition for certiorari 
in Alston	v.	NCAA.109  Plaintiffs in Alston claim that any caps on education-
related benefits are unlawful restraints on trade, while the NCAA has 
responded with its usual “rule of reason” defense.  The Supreme Court 
rendered its decision on June 21, 2021.110	
  While the NCAA suffered a major defeat in NCAA	 v.	 Board	 of	
Regents in its ability to control television revenue unilaterally, the courts 
have been more sympathetic to preserving the NCAA’s brand of 
“amateurism.”  Courts have been reluctant to find amateurism to be a 
restraint on trade and violative of antitrust laws.  An “amateur” is 
generally defined as “one who engages in a pursuit, study, science, or 
sport as a pastime rather than as a profession” or “one lacking in 
experience and competence in an art or science.”111  However, the 
NCAA’s definition of “amateurism” significantly expands the traditional 
definition.  Per the NCAA, the simple act of hiring an “agent” is sufficient 
for a student-athlete to lose “amateur” status and violate the NCAA 
principles regardless of whether the student-athlete actually earns any 
compensation or is successful in garnering a professional contract.112  In 
Banks	 v.	 NCAA,113 Braxton Banks, a standout football player for the 
University of Notre Dame, challenged the NCAA’s amateurism 
 
Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (Dec. 16, 2020), and cert. granted sub nom; 
Am. Athletic Conf. v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 972, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2020). 
	 107	 Id. 
	 108	 Id. 
 109 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (Dec. 16, 2020).  Oral 
arguments were heard on March 31, 2021. 
 110 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston Et Al., Slip Opinion published 
June 21, 2021.  See US Supreme Court Opinions: 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/20.  
 111 “Amateur” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2021, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dicti.onary/amateur April 2021).   
 112 NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1 Use	of	Agents.	An individual shall be ineligible for participation 
in an intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be 
represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or 
reputation in that sport. 
 113 Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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requirements. 114  Before exhausting his NCAA eligibility, Banks took the 
active step to make himself eligible for the 1990 NFL Draft and signed 
with an agent to enhance his draft prospect.115  When he was not drafted 
nor offered a contract with an NFL team, Banks petitioned the NCAA for 
reinstatement so he could play out his final year of eligibility at Notre 
Dame.116  After the NCAA refused to consider Banks’ request for 
reinstatement, Banks filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA 
claiming that their amateurism rules were an unlawful restraint on 
trade.117  Both the district court and Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the 
NCAA, finding that Banks failed to show that the NCAA’s rules were 
anticompetitive.118 
 
III. The Current Battleground: What are Rights of 
Publicity? 
A. NAME, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS RIGHTS 
Name, image, and likeness rights (NILs), often referred to as “rights 
of publicity” or “rights of celebrity,” provide an individual with “the right 
to control the commercial use of” their NILs, and any other unequivocal 
aspect of one’s personality.119  Unlike most intellectual property claims, 
the power to bring suit upon this right is not preempted by federal law.  
In fact, most rights of publicity claims are brought under state statute or 
common law.120  The Second Restatement of Torts recognizes four 
categories of protected privacy rights: intrusion upon another’s 
seclusion, misappropriation of a name or likeness, unreasonable or 
unauthorized publicity, and false light.121   
The phrase, “right of publicity,” was first introduced by Judge Frank 
in his majority opinion for Haelan	Laboratories,	 Inc.	v.	Topps	Chewing	
 
 114 Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th Cir. 1992). 
	 115	 Id. at 1084. 
	 116	 Id.  
	 117	 Id. 
 118 Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1992). 
	 119	 Rights	 of	 Publicity, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/publicity.  See	 generally	 Jonathan Faber, A	 Brief	
History	of	 the	Right	of	Publicity, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/brief-
history-of-rop (last updated July 31, 2015) (discussing Indiana’s right of publicity 
statute, which gives a property interest in an individual’s “distinctive appearance, 
gestures [and] mannerisms.”).	
	 120	 See	 id.	 (explaining that some states have codified the common law right of 
publicity).  
	 121	 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (Am. L. Inst. 1977). 
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Gum,	 Inc.,122 which was a lawsuit that centered on the right to use a 
baseball player’s photograph on baseball cards. 123  Judge Frank cited 
false endorsement cases from the early 1900s that recognized an 
individual’s right to control the use of their own likeness.124  In defining 
this right, Judge Frank stated that:  
[A] man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e. the 
right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture…This right 
might be called a ‘right of publicity.’ For it is common knowledge that 
many prominent persons (especially actors and ball players), far from 
having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their 
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money 
for authoring advertisements, popularizing their countenances, 
displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses, trains, and subways.125	
Although Haelan	 Laboratories set a foundation for violations of 
rights of publicity causes of action, rights of publicity claims were rarely 
brought until the Supreme Court ruled on Zacchini	v.	Scripps‐Howard	
Broadcasting	 Co.126  In its first major opinion examining the right of 
publicity, the Supreme Court held that a news broadcasting company is 
not necessarily protected by the first amendment when it uses a 
performer’s likeness without authorization.127  Writing for the majority, 
Justice White established a balancing test that weighs the societal value 
established through a publisher’s first amendment usage of an 
individual’s NILs and the individual’s own right to profit from the 
exploitation of those rights.128  
Later, the Sixth Circuit established in Carson	 v.	 Here’s	 Johnny	
Portable	Toilets,	Inc.129	that the right to control one’s likeness includes 
unlicensed use of “symbolic” mannerisms or catchphrases and that a 
plaintiff only had to prove that a defendant generated an economic 
benefit derived from unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s likeness.130 
The right of publicity continued to expand until Comedy	 III	 v.	
Saderup,131 where the Court held that a work may portray the likeness 
of a public figure if the representation amounts to a	 transformative 
 
 122 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
	 123	 Id. at 867. 
	 124	 See id. at 868 (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88 (1917); Madison 
Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938). 
	 125	 Id.	(emphasis added). 
 126 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).  
	 127	 See	id.	at 577-78.  
	 128	 Id. 
 129 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
	 130	 Id.	at 836.	
	 131	 See	Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387 (Cal. 2001). 
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reinterpretation.132  Here, the Defendant’s “cutting and pasting” of the 
public figure’s image to a T-Shirt violated the Plaintiff’s right of publicity, 
but, its use in combination with other creative elements, transformed 
the work as a whole into a new, protectable expression. 133   
On the federal level, suits raising “rights of publicity” concerns 
typically seek to establish a claim under the “false endorsement of 
origin” claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.134  Unlike state-
based right of publicity actions, 43(a) claims require a false or 
misleading description or representation of fact which is likely to cause 
confusion or to deceive about the affiliation or association of a person 
with another person.135  This approach emphasizes the likelihood of 
confusion in the origin of a work and, therefore, practically limit its’ 
application to well-known celebrities, while non-celebrities whose 
likeness is misappropriated are limited to only right of publicity 
claims.136  NFL Hall of Fame player Jim Brown unsuccessfully pursued 
this strategy in his 2013 suit against Electronic Arts, Inc. where he raised 
Lanham act claims against the use of his likeness in the company’s 
popular Madden	NFL	series of video games. 137  Citing the “Rogers test” 
in the case, 138  the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling 
finding that Brown had not alleged facts that satisfied either condition 
to allow a § 43(a) claim to succeed under the Rogers	test.139  Despite its 
shortcomings in these cases, the Lanham Act claims can be used as a 
forum selection issues by allowing plaintiffs to raise or strengthen 
claims in jurisdictions where state rights of publicity statutes or 
common law may not be not as favorable.140   
Rights of publicity are not unique to sports, but rather provide a 
broad cause of action to give individuals to decide how and by whom 
 
	 132	 Id. at 404. 
	 133	 Id.	at 393, 395, 409. 
 134 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
	 135	 Id.	 
	 136	 Id.	 
 137 Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1253, 1237 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 138 Recognizing the need to balance the public’s First Amendment interest in free 
expression against the public’s interest in being free from consumer confusion about 
affiliation and endorsement, the Second Circuit created the “Rogers	 test” in Rogers	v.	
Grimaldi.  875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). Under the Rogers	test, § 43(a) will not be applied 
to expressive works “unless the [use of the trademark or other identifying material] has 
no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic 
relevance, unless the [use of trademark or other identifying material] explicitly misleads 
as to the source or the content of the work.” Id.	at 999. 	
	 139	 Brown, 724 F.3d at 1248. 
 140 Mark S. VanderBroek, Understanding False Endorsement and Right of Publicity 
Claims in a Digital Age, Vol 73 No. 12, IɴᴛᴀBᴜʟʟᴇᴛɪɴ (July 15, 2018). 
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their NILs can be exploited. The higher the “celebrity status” of an 
individual, the greater the likelihood that exploitation or 
misappropriation can impair the rightsholder’s economic interests. 
B. THE CURRENT BATTLEGROUND: NCAA AND NIL RIGHTS 
While the NCAA has been facing almost constant litigation from 
student-athlete representatives on the antitrust claims against the 
NCAA’s limits on scholarship numbers, amount of grants in aid, and 
other claims invoking the restraints on the labor market for student-
athletes competing in NCAA events, the NCAA is also battling on a new 
front.  Rather than attacking amateurism as a whole, as contemplated in 
the antitrust cases, the effort to grant student-athletes the right to 
capitalize on their NIL rights provides a narrower focus by separating 
the issue of compensation for athletic participation – or employment – 
from the right to earn compensation through other means through the 
exploitation of their rights of publicity.  However, the NCAA’s reluctance 
to date has given rise to a tidal wave of state legislation has been 
weaponized against it to allow players to otherwise circumvent NCAA 
amateurism rules. 
While the right of publicity provides an individual with the right to 
control the commercialization rights of their own persona, the NCAA has 
prohibited such opportunities as a violation of its Principle of 
Amateurism.  Per NCAA Bylaw 2.9, “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs 
in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated 
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits 
to be derived.141  Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an 
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation 
by professional and commercial enterprises.”142  The NCAA steadfastly 
leans on amateurism to eschew any compensation related to 
commercial opportunities connected to a student-athlete’s athletic 
participation.143 
 
 141 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, at 3, (Aug. 1, 2020).  
	 142	 Id. 
 143 2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, Bylaw 12.5.2.1 at 77 (2019), 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D120.pdf	 (addressing 
Advertisements and Promotions After Becoming a Student-Athlete and	 stating “after 
becoming a student-athlete, an individual shall not be eligible for participation in 
intercollegiate athletics if the individual: (a) Accepts any remuneration for or permits 
the use of his or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the 
sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind; or(b) Receives remuneration 
for endorsing a commercial product or service through the individual’s use of such 
product or service”). 
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With the courts upholding the NCAA’s ability to force athletes to 
forgo outside compensation related to their athletic participation, 
proponents for student-athletes chose a different strategy.  Instead of 
challenging amateurism in the courts, they instead turned to state 
legislatures to undercut the NCAA’s ability to enforce restrictions 
against a student-athlete’s ability to profit from their NILs.  California 
was the first state to pass legislation that enjoined the NCAA and its 
member institutions from placing any limits on the ability of student-
athletes to capitalize on their NIL rights.144  California’s	Fair Play to Pay 
Act made it the first state in the nation to enact legislation allowing 
student athletes to capitalize from the use of their NILs and earn 
compensation.145		The law allows all student athletes enrolled in public 
and private four-year colleges and universities in California to hire 
agents to assist in generating revenue from their rights of publicity and 
to seek out these revenue opportunities without the fear of losing their 
NCAA eligibility or scholarships.  California colleges were also barred 
from enforcing NCAA amateurism rules that prevent student-athletes 
from earning such compensation as well as restricting the NCAA from 
disqualifying California universities from intercollegiate sports for 
violating the NCAA’s amateurism rules in this regard.146  The California 
law, however, provided a window for the NCAA to react to the legislation 
by delaying the effective date until January 1, 2023.147  Other states did 
not provide the NCAA with that same luxury.  Florida’s law is set to take 
effect on July 1, 2021, providing the NCAA with only a limited window 
to react to the new law.148  New Jersey, Colorado, and Nebraska also 
passed similar legislation creating a complex compliance environment 
 
 144 Press Release, Office of the Governor Gavin Newsom, Governor Newsom Signs SB 
206, Taking on Long-Standing Power Imbalance in College Sports (Sept. 30, 2019) 
(available at https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/09/30/governor-newsom-signs-sb-206-
taking-on-long-standing-power-imbalance-in-college-sports/).  
	 145	 Id. 
	 146	 Id. 
 147 Dan Murphy, Florida	Name,	 Image,	Likeness	Bill	now	a	Law;	 State	Athletes	 can	




 148 Press Release, The Fla. Senate, Intercollegiate Athlete Compensation & Rights 
Legislation Signed Into Law (June 12, 2020) (on file with author at 
https://www.flsenate.gov/Media/PressRelease/Show/3557) (discussing Florida’s 
legislation concerning the state name, image, likeness bill now a law, which would allow 
state athletes to profit from endorsements next summer); Dan Murphy, Florida	Name,	
Image,	 Likeness	 Bill	 Now	 a	 Law;	 State	 Athletes	 Can	 Profit	 From	 Endorsements	 Next	
Summer, ENT. & SPORTS PROGRAMMING NETWORK (June 20, 2020), 
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with varying legal provisions and effective dates across the country.149  
The NCAA quickly assembled its own legislation to amend its rules to 
comply with the emerging state laws,150 although the NCAA changed 
those plans when the US Department of Justice voiced concern that the 
proposed NCAA rules would potentially trigger antitrust laws.151  The 
NCAA then looked to Congress to pass legislation to preempt these new 
state laws.	
On the federal level, elected officials have also jockeyed amongst 
themselves to capitalize on the popularity of supporting student-
athletes with their legislative proposals.  Senators Cory Booker (D-N.J.) 
and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) introduced an athlete-friendly bill, 
dubbed the “College Athletes Bill of Rights,” which would introduce 
professional league-styled revenue sharing, group licensing, lifetime 
education benefits, and other player benefits at the expense of the NCAA. 
152  The Booker-Blumenthal bill also focuses predominantly on 
providing relief to men’s football and basketball players.153  The bill 
ignores the existing redistributive properties in the NCAA that fund 
other sports, male and female.  While celebrated by football and 
basketball players, it is probably the least administrable and most 
disruptive bill to the current realities and constraints of the NCAA.  
Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) introduced his own competing 
 
 149 Press Release, Insider NJ, ‘New Jersey Fair Play Act’ Signed Into Law (Sept. 14, 
2020) (on file with author at https://www.insidernj.com/press-release/new-jersey-
fair-play-act-signed-law/); Steve Berkowitz, Colorado	 Governor	 Signs	 College	 Athlete	
Name,	 Image	 and	 Likeness	 Bill, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 2020),  
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/03/20/colorado-governor-
signs-college-athlete-name-image- likeness-bill/2887481001/; Press Release, Neb. 
Legislature, (July 21, 2020) (on file with author at 
http://news.legislature.ne.gov/dist08/2020/07/21/press-release-legislature-passes-
the-nebraska-fair-pay-to-play-act/).  
	 150	 DI	Council	 Introduces	Name,	 Image	and	Likeness	Concepts	 into	Legislative	Cycle, 
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N: Media (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-council-introduces-
name-image-and-likeness-concepts-legislative-cycle. 
 151 Lilah Burke, NCAA	to	Delay	Name,	Image	and	Likeness	Vote	After	DOJ	Letter, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Jan. 11, 2021), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2021/01/11/ncaa-delay-name-image-
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legislation,154 which the NCAA endorsed.155  This rival bill to the 
Booker/Blumenthal measure supports student-athlete NIL rights but 
also provides some antitrust protections for the NCAA, thus making the 
likelihood of a quick resolution in a fiercely partisan Congress unlikely.	
While the concept of amateurism is noble in theory, it fails to 
appreciate the reality of today’s college sports landscape.  Cable 
networks frequently telecast Division I football and basketball games, 
which generate hundreds of millions of dollars in broadcast revenues.156  
Schools spend significant resources on multimedia and public relations 
to engage fans and grow not only their own brand, but also the brand of 
their student-athletes as a by-product of their success.  Many college 
athletes have greater name recognition and commercial earning 
potential than not only other professional athletes, but also local 
congresspersons, experts in their fields, and even many television or 
film actors and actresses.  
NILs present a unique opportunity to capitalize on the platform 
that the sports industry presents.  Student-athletes also have the 
opportunity to create their own fame.  For example, Donald De La Haye 
has been deemed ineligible as an NCAA player because of the money he 
has made off of his YouTube videos.157  As a backup kicker on the 
University of Central Florida football team, De La Haye gained a sizable 
following on YouTube for a series of videos that he created chronicling 
the life of a backup kicker in major college football.158  Based on current 
NCAA rules, he was forced to decide whether to monetize his videos and 
gain revenue or remain an amateur under the NCAA’s definition and 
forego the revenue opportunities.159  Modern technology and social 
media allows student-athletes to amass large followings that become 
attractive to corporate marketers looking to utilize their influence.  The 
De La Haye case shows that marketability does not need to be tied to 
 
 154 Ralph D. Russo, Florida	 Sen.	 Rubio	 Introduces	NIL	 bill	 to	 Push	NCAA	 Changes, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 18, 2020, 
https://apnews.com/article/7d9e67592f2e2b34eb3445f004233315. 
	 155	 NCAA	Statement	on	Sen.	Marco	Rubio	Bill, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N: Media 
(June 18, 2020), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-
statement-sen-marco-rubio-bill. 
 156 Jordan James, Report:	 SEC	TV	Deal	will	 Increase	 School	Payouts	by	 $20	Million, 
247SPORTS (Dec. 20, 2019), https://247sports.com/college/auburn/Article/SEC-
college-football-TV-contract-CBS-ESPN-ABC-revenue-140925524/. 
 157 Chuck Schilken, Central	Florida	Kicker	Donald	De	La	Haye	Loses	his	NCAA	Eligibility	
because	 of	 his	 YouTube	 Videos, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 01, 2017), 
https://www.latimes.com/sports/more/la-sp-ucf-kicker-ineligible-youtube-
20170801-story.html.  
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athletic success, but rather the name recognition and notoriety of 
becoming a “celebrity.” 
The “celebrity factor” that is the root of the current battle on the 
NIL front is a classic “chicken and egg” problem.  The NCAA has 
traditionally eschewed student-athletes of any athletics-related 
revenue opportunities while simultaneously promoting many of these 
same student-athletes to celebrity status.  Many sports fans revered 
names such as Tim Tebow, Zion Williamson, and Trevor Lawrence well 
before they even progressed past their freshman years in college.  The 
NCAA fears that the dollar signs in the eyes of seventeen and eighteen-
year-old prospects will greatly undermine the recruiting process and 
further skew the competitive landscape.160  Yet this fear bears little 
difference to the current recruiting landscape, where sports facilities 
are the most common mediums for luring top prospects.  High profile 
recruiting scandals at both the University of Tennessee’s football team 
and University of Louisville’s basketball team illustrate only the latest 
examples of the corruption, money, and violative actions taken by 
schools, boosters, and coaches to garner success on the field. 161  
Allowing players to harness the value of their personal brands allows 
these actions to come above board and be tracked.  But this approach 
does not fit well with the NCAA’s typical “command and control” 
regulatory model.  The NCAA fears that once NIL restrictions are lifted, 
they will never be able to be controlled again since such restrictions 
would then curtail economic interests and conflict with antitrust 
laws.162  At least right now, the NCAA has the veil of amateurism to hide 
behind in issuing its regulations. 
Player advocates have pursued the “states first” strategy on the 
legislative front and targeted labor-friendly states such as California and 
New Jersey and other states, such as Florida, where college athletics 
 
	 160	 See Ross Dellenger, With	Recruiting	in	Mind,	States	Jockey	to	One‐Up	Each	Other	in	
Chaotic	 Race	 for	 NIL	 Laws, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (March 4, 2021), 
https://www.si.com/college/2021/03/04/name-image-likeness-state-laws-congress-
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that	 Means, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN (last updated January 19, 2021), 
https://www.tennessean.com/story/sports/college/vols/2021/01/18/tennessee-
vols-football-ncaa-violations-jeremy-pruitt-firing/4207318001/; Ben Kercheval, 
Louisville	Basketball	Receives	NCAA	Notice	of	Allegations	in	Connection	with	FBI	Investigation, CBS 
SPORTS (May 4, 2020), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/louisville-basketball-
receives-ncaa-notice-of-allegations-in-connection-with-fbi-investigation/.  
 162 Lilah Burke, NCAA	to	Delay	Name,	Image	and	Likeness	Vote	After	DOJ	Letter, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (January 11, 2021), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2021/01/11/ncaa-delay-name-image-
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carry disproportionate importance.  This strategy forced the NCAA to 
act.163  The state-based approach, however, is hugely problematic.  
Unlike legislation promoted through the Uniform Laws Commission 
(ULC), this approach is haphazard and divergent from one state to the 
other and therefore lacks uniformity.  Further, this approach places 
unique limitations on schools based on the states in which they reside.  
A state such as University of Florida can have very different standards 
than its neighbor, the University of Georgia; yet, the two schools play 
each other every season.  While the “states first” strategy has proven to 
be successful in gaining market-share for the legislation, the patchwork 
nature of state laws to regulate a national sports enterprise is bound for 
unwieldy complexity and, ultimately, failure. 
 
IV. Where Does the NCAA Go From Here? 
Granting players with the opportunity to capitalize on their NIL 
rights is the easy answer for the NCAA.  It essentially allows student-
athletes to control their own revenue potential without costing NCAA 
schools anything by allowing the athletes to remain amateur athletes 
and non-employees.  The NCAA’s paternalistic tendencies were pushing 
the organization to implement a rigid framework and “police” NIL deals 
until the Department of Justice stepped in.  The NCAA’s desire to prevent 
manipulation of NIL deals for recruiting benefits ignores the skewed 
recruiting landscape that already exists.  Many industry watchers 
believe such measures will lead to disaster and consequently alienate 
the NCAA from key members and move the organization beyond a point 
of no return.  Instead, the NCAA would be better served by imposing a 
moratorium on its own restrictions and allowing the NIL rights market 
to develop before looking at how to control it.  Existing bylaws already 
provide a safety net for some of the negative behavior the NCAA tries to 
control and would not need to be discarded in their entirety. 
Meanwhile, Congress must enact legislation to bring common 
sense to college athletics.  Unlike professional leagues where players 
and management collectively bargain and have mutual interests, college 
athletics is a unique enterprise that needs oversight and guardrails 
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against itself.  Left to its own devices, the NCAA has proven it lacks 
responsiveness and flexibility by taking often zealous stances to 
emerging issues.  Secondly, the NCAA’s authority itself has been 
increasingly challenged by its membership, as depicted in the academic 
scandal at the University of North Carolina and the sexual abuse 
incidents at both Penn State and Michigan State. 164  The NCAA’s strict 
adherence to amateurism despite the tremendous explosion of 
technological innovation and multimedia has alienated others as well.  
More important than regulating NILs, the NCAA’s primary interest 
is protecting amateurism.  Amateurism allows NCAA schools to still 
consider their student-athletes as students, not employees, and 
therefore continue to escape wages, benefits, and other compensation 
due to employees.  This conversion of amateur athletes to employment 
status would be far more devastating for the NCAA than permitting 
student-athletes to solicit and capitalize on their own efforts to market 
their NILs.  Classifying student-athletes as employees would force 
schools to actually compensate athletes beyond scholarships and the 
“soft” group benefits, such as enhanced educational opportunities, 
academic support, and other collective benefits at each school.  In 
addition to the cost of wages and taxes, it would also subject the schools 
to a host of other employment laws and regulations and likely lead to 
collective bargaining at some point.  If the NCAA’s goal is to preserve a 
level playing field for the breadth of the schools that are competing 
within its framework, then it is actually in its best interests to allow 
student-athletes to harness the power of their platforms. 
In the Northwestern football players’ attempt to unionize in 
2014,165 the NCAA was steadfastly concerned that recognizing the 
football players as a union and establishing student-athletes as 
employees, would undermine their status as amateur – not professional 
– athletes and thus places the employment burdens on schools 
themselves.166  Federal and state laws maintain very clear standards in 
the classification of workers, but mainly between employees and 
 
	 164	 See	Greg Barnes, UNC	Response	Challenges	NCAA	Missteps, 247SPORTS.COM (Aug. 4, 
2016), https://247sports.com/college/north-carolina/board/102714/Contents/unc-
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2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/after-its-penn-state-
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	 165	 See	generally, Board	Unanimously	Decides	to	Decline	Jurisdiction	in	Northwestern	
Case, NLRB.GOV: NEWS AND PUBLICATIONS (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-
outreach/news-story/board-unanimously-decides-to-decline-jurisdiction-in-
northwestern-case.  
	 166	 Id. 
BONDAROWICZ (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2021  7:35 PM 
602 SETON	HALL	LEGISLATIVE	JOURNAL [Vol. 45:3 
independent contractors.167  Control is typically the main differentiator 
as employers are able to exercise the greatest amount of control over 
their employees while independent contractors retain more flexibility 
and independence in providing services to their client-employers.168  
Similar difficulties previously existed in the classification of graduate 
research assistants at universities where they share responsibilities of 
an employee and a student, but under the direction of supervising 
professors.169   
For student-athletes, they are under the tight control of coaches 
who regulate their practice schedules, meetings, nutrition, and even 
their academic schedules to fit into the needs of the team.  Scholarships 
are controlled by the coaches as well and can be terminated or extended 
based on the coaches’ goals and objectives in building their rosters – or 
workforce.  Ironically, classification of student-athletes as employees 
would provide the NCAA member schools with the greatest level of 
control over their athletes – including the regulation of their NILs in a 
manner consistent with their employment – but it would impose the 
burden of employees on the universities. 
Approving NILs for student-athletes is the easy answer for the 
NCAA as it would not force a change in employment classification.  It 
allows the student-athletes to become their own entrepreneurs and 
control their own NIL rights without costing the NCAA schools anything.  
It is true that some student-athletes will prosper while others will not 
see as much benefit; however, this self-control absolves the NCAA of the 
responsibility of monitoring this system.  Instead of preserving the 
“communistic” system of ensuring that all student-athletes receive the 
same direction financial compensation (namely, zero), it would allow 
the NCAA to be more capitalistic and allow student-athletes to control 
their own destiny. 
Lastly, the NCAA must shift its mindset from the “command and 
control” regulatory environment to a self-regulatory environment, 
possibly with federal government oversight to provide it with great 
investigative authority to regulate abuses.  There is precedent for 
government oversight and monitoring of private, self-regulatory 
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 169 “As of March 15, 2021, the proposed NLRB rule published on September 23, 2019, 
at 84 FR 49691, and corrected on October 16, 2019, at 84 FR 55265, is withdrawn.”  
Jurisdiction-Nonemployee Status of University and College Students Working in 
Connection With Their Studies, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,297 (March 15, 2021) (to be codified at 
29 C.F.R. pt. 103).  
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organizations.170  This model has been the basis of regulation in the 
financial industry for decades where organizations such as the New 
York Stock Exchange, FINRA, and others have been granted regulatory 
authority to police themselves with government oversight of their 
activities.171  These organizations do maintain tight rules on their 
membership with oversight from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  This approach would be a powerful step in bringing 
credibility back to the NCAA and allowing it to function more effectively.  
It allows the NCAA to set the guard rails for the process of regulating the 
impacts of the proposed NILs while having federal oversight to prevent 
abuses and ensure the NCAA is true to its mission.  
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